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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :

Case No.

v.
LEMUEL THOMAS SMALL,

;

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. s
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals properly applied this Court's decision in State
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in holding that defendant's
consent to search was not valid and that the evidence seized from
his vehicle pursuant to his consent was therefore not admissible?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on March 19,
1992, and appears in State v. Small, 182 Utah Adv. Rep, 55 (Utah
App. Mar. 19, 1992) (a copy of the opinion is contained in
Appendix A ) .
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is
contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lemuel T. Small, was charged with one count
of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), and
two counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), second and third
degree felonies, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp.
1991) (R. 150-51).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized incident to the roadblock stop of
defendant's vehicle and pursuant to his consent, a jury convicted
him as charged (R. 28, 55-58, 200-02).

The court sentenced

defendant to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison for the second degree felony, and terms of zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison for the two third degree felonies,
all terms to run concurrently (R. 302).
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal
and state constitutions, and therefore the contraband seized from
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed.
Acknowledging the State's concession that the roadblock did not
2
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meet the requirements of Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990), the court of appeals held that the roadblock
violated the fourth amendment.

State v. Small, 182 Utah Adv.

Rep. 55, 56 (Utah App. Mar. 19, 1992).

It further held that,

under State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), defendant's
consent to the search of his vehicle was not sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid the taint of
that initial illegality, and therefore the consent was invalid.
Id. at 56-57.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE SEEKS CERTIORARI REVIEW FOR THE
SAME REASONS IT HAS IN STATE V. SIMS, CASE
NO. 910218: THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED
STATE V. ARROYO, 796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN
A MANNER THAT APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH
FLO"IDA V. ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH
ARROYO IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TWOPART TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF
CONSENT TO SEARCH
In holding that defendant's consent was not
sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to avoid
the taint of that initial illegality and thus could not provide a
basis for the search of defendant's car, the court of appeals
determined that "[t]his case is indistinguishable from fState v.1
Simsr,808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991)]."
at 57.

Small. 182 Utah Adv. Rep.

The Court currently has under advisement the State's

petition for a writ of certiorari in Sims, Case No. 910218, which
seeks review on the ground that the court of appeals applied
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in a manner that
appears to be inconsistent with Florida v. Arrovo, 460 U.S. 491

3
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(1983), which Arroyo identified as an example of the application
of the exploitation prong of the two-part test for determining
the validity of consent to search.

The State seeks certiorari in

the instant case on the same basis as in Sims; therefore, it
incorporates by reference Point II of the Sims certiorari
petition (Appendix B) and the better developed argument made by
the State in a case currently pending in the Court, State v.
Thurman, Case No. 910494 (Appendix C ) .
For the reasons argued in the Sims petition for
certiorari, as further supported by the Thurman brief, this Court
should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals'
decision.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/o^day

of May, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
0
Assistant Attorney General

4
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theory outside the context of insurance contracts. Moreover, a broad application of Bracey
is not reasonable because it would
eviscerate the general rule; attorney fees would
be awarded virtually every time a party is
found in breach of its contract. It is unlikely
that the Supreme Court intended such a
drastic result, since the Court continues to
refer to the general rule as though it had
continujdftgnificance. See Bracey, 781 P.2d
at 417riimilarly, it is unlikely the Supreme
Court Intended such a major departure from
the long-standing rule without specifically
saying so.
A reasonable interpretation of Bracey, then,
is to confine its authorization of an award of
attorney fees as consequential damages, incurred in litigation against the other party to the
contract, to the limited situation where an
insurer breaches its contract with an insured.
Since the contract in the present case is not
insurance related, the Bracey exception does
not apply. Neither does the third-party exception. Therefore, we rely on the general rule,
and disallow the award of attorney fees since
there is no contractual or statutory basis for
such an award.
While we otherwise affirm, we vacate the
trial court's award of attorney fees.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Both parties agree that the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous and that interpretation of the agreement is, therefore, a matter of
law. After fully considering the arguments of Heinz
and the estate, we are persuaded that the trial court
correctly held that Heinz breached the settlement
agreement by failing to pay the estate its complete
distributive share of the dissolved partnership. We
also conclude that the trial court correctly awarded
the estate $97,110.49 as the remaining portion of its
distributive share due under the settlement agreement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's interpretation of the agreement and the judgment awarded
to the estate as its rightful distributive share of the
dissolved partnership.

Cite as

182 Utah Adv. Rep. 55
IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of UUh,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Lemuel Thomas SMALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900382-CA
FILED: March 19,1992
Fourth District, Millard County
Honorable George E. Ballif
ATTORNEYS:
G. Fred Metos and Stephen R. McCaughey,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, David Thompson, and
Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial
of appellant Lemuel T. Small's motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a
roadblock and subsequent search of the
vehicle in which Small was a passenger. We
reverse and remand for a new trial in which
the evidence seized from the vehicle is to be
suppressed.
FACTS
Small does not challenge the trial court's
findings of fact. Therefore, for purposes of
this appeal the facts are as follows.
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard
County Sheriffs office, conducted a roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a section of
Interstate 15. Notice of the roadblock was
published in the Millard County Chronicle one
week before the roadblock was instituted and
signs were placed on the freeway, warning
drivers that they would have to stop. Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to
operate the roadblock. They were instructed to
check for drivers' licenses and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to
further question anyone who looked suspicious.
During the roadblock, all vehicles were
stopped, including the vehicle in which Small
was a passenger. The vehicle was driven by
Dennis Shoulderblade. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who executed the stop, testified that both
Small and Shoulderblade produced valid ide-

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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ntification. The vehicle was not registered to
either Small or Shoulderbiade. Small told the
officer that the vehicle belonged to a friend of
his. Officer Whatcott sought confirmation of
registration through radio dispatch. He also
asked Small and Shoulderbiade if there were
any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle.
Both replied in the negative. Officer Whatcott
requested permission to search the vehicle, and
Small consented.
In searching the vehicle, Officer Whatcott
located a substantial quantity of drugs, drug
paraphernalia, firearms, and cash. Both Small
and Shoulderbiade were arrested. Officer
Whatcott continued to search the vehicle, and
upon smelling marijuana, opened the trunk of
the vehicle and discovered more drugs and
paraphernalia.
In an amended information, Small and
Shoulderbiade were charged with several
counts of possession of controlled substances.
Both defendants filed motions to suppress the
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The
motions were based on the alleged illegality of
the roadblock. The trial court concluded that
the roadblock was instituted in a lawful
manner. The trial court also found that Small
and Shoulderbiade consented to the search of
the vehicle, and that the consent was never
withdrawn. Based on the foregoing, the court
denied the motions to suppress.
Small and Shoulderbiade were tried by a
jury on February 16, 1990. The jury convicted
Small of one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and two counts of
possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute (methamphetamine and
marijuana), a second and a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1988).*
ISSUES
Small appeals the denial of his motion to
suppress, contending that (1) the roadblock
stop of the vehicle in which he was riding was
illegal; and (2) because there was insufficient
attenuation between the illegal roadblock and
any consent given, all evidence discovered
subsequent to the roadblock stop should have
been suppressed by the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a challenge to a lower court's
suppression ruling, we will not reverse the
findings of fact underlying that ruling unless
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer,
803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert,
denied, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah 199.1). Those
factual findings are clearly erroneous only if
they are against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep.
11, 12 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Leonard,
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah App. 1991).

CODE*CO
Provo, Utah

The issue of the constitutionality of a roadblock stop is a matter of law which we review
with no particular deference to the trial
court's conclusions. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d
141,144 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending.
LEGALITY OF THE ROADBLOCK
Small asserts that the roadblock at which he
was stopped violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Specifically, Small alleges that the roadblock
did not meet the objective standards required
by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution.
At the time of its denial of Small's motion
to suppress, the trial court did not have the
benefit of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
The State concedes that the roadblock in the
present case fails to meet the requirements for
roadblocks set out in Sitz. We agree. Thus,
the roadblock stop violated Small's Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures, and the trial court's conclusion to the
contrary is reversed.2
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
FOLLOWING ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Having determined that the roadblock stop
of the vehicle was unconstitutional, we must
now determine if the subsequent warrantless
search was nevertheless valid. Relying on State
v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
pending, Small asserts that while he consented
to the search of the vehicle, his consent was
obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of
events that began with the illegal roadblock,
and that as a result, his consent is not valid.
The State has the burden of establishing
that the evidence obtained following the illegal
roadblock was not tainted by showing the
consent given was sufficiently attenuated from
that illegality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151.
Two factors determine whether
consent to a search is lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct. The inquiry should focus
on whether the consent was voluntary and whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of
the prior illegality. Evidence obtained in searches following police
illegality must meet both tests to be
admissible.
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah
1990) (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987)). The State
argues that because the trial court did not
make explicitfindingson either prong of the Arroyo test, we should remand for the trial
court to make detailed findings to support the
consent determination. We decline the State's
invitation to remand for further findings3
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because, as this court stated in State v.
Castner, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 & n.3
(Utah App. 1992), when the record at the
suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed and
there are no contested facts, we are in as good
a position as the trial court to decide the taintedness/attenuation issue.

57
2. Because the roadblock does not pass muster
under the federal constitution, we need not consider
its validity under the state constitution. See State v.
Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
3. We acknowledge that fact-sensitive issues such
as consent are best resolved by the trial court.
However, in this case counsel for both Small and
for the State indicated at oral argument that there
were no facts in dispute and it was doubtful that
any further enlightening facts would be forthcoI ming.

A. Voluntary Consent
Voluqgutpess of consent is a fact sensitive
question tod we look to the totality of circumstances to ascertain if there is clear and
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given. Castner, 179 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 13; Carter, 812 P.2d at 467; State
Cite as
v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah
1S2 Utah Adv. Rep. 57
App. 1991); Stare v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
IN THE
887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1990). The trial court determined
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
that Small had consented to the searches.
Small does not challenge that ruling on STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff aod Appellee,
appeal. However, the trial court did not
v.
address whether or not the consent was voluntary. This is an important first prong in the Ar- Jorge FIGUEROA-SOLORIO
Defendant and Appellant.
royo analysis. We find nothing in the undisputed facts that suggests Small's consent was
No. 910170-CA
not voluntary.
FILED: March 19,1992
B. Dissipation of Taint
The conclusion that there was voluntary Third District, Salt Lake County
consent does not end our inquiry as we must Honorable Pat B. Brian
also determine if the consent was untainted by
the prior illegality. Castner, 179 Utah Adv. ATTORNEYS:
Rep. at 14. "We examine several factors to Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for
determine if there has been an exploitation of
Appellant
a prior illegality: temporal proximity of the R. Paul Van D&n> and David B. Thompson,
illegality and the evidence sought to be suppSalt Lake City, for Appellee
ressed, the presence of intervening factors, and
the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct/ Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
Id.; accord Sims, 808 P.2d at 150; Arroyo,
This opinion is subject to revision before
796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4.
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
This case is indistinguishable from Sims.
The record demonstrates a very short period RUSSON, Judge:
of time elapsed between Small's stop at the
Defendant Jorge Figueroa-Solorio appeals
roadblock and Officer Whatcott's request to
search. As for intervening factors, none exist. his conviction of possession of a controlled
The consent was obtained during the ongoing substance, a third degree felony, in violation
illegal roadblock stop. On the uncontroverted of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
facts before us, we conclude that Small's (1990).
consent to have the vehicle searched was not
FACTS
sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of
On January 1, 1991, Salt Lake City Police
the illegal roadblock.
Officers BX. Smith and Louis Jones observed
defendant cross State Street at approximately
CONCLUSION
Small's convictions are reversed and the 916 South in Salt Lake City. There is no crocase is remanded to the trial court for proce- sswalk or traffic light at that location. Accordingly, the officers decided to issue a jaywaedings in accord with this opinion.
lking citation to defendant, pursuant to Utah
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Code Ann. §41-6-79 (1988) of the Motor
WE CONCUR:
Vehicle Act.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Officers Smith and Jones approached defLeonard H. Russon, Judge
endant, who had gotten into a parked car.
They asked defendant to get out of the car
1. The current versions of the statutes under which and then asked for identification. The defenSmall was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. dant said that he did not have any I.D., but
158-374 (Supp. 1992).
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a
peace officer4, explicit authority should not be required.
Because the court of appeals' state constitutional holding has
broad implications for law enforcement, this Court should grant
certiorari and review that holding.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO,
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V.
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT.
After the court of appeals had determined that the
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted
pursuant to defendant's consent.

Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-

14.
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge
4

Although the court of appeals concluded that there is
-nothing in the Utah code that "specifically prohibits the
roadblock that was conducted here," Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at
10, it did not directly resolve the question of whether police
officers have implied authority to conduct roadblocks. Such
implied authority can be derived from the general statutes which
pertain to the authority of law enforcement officers in this
state. See Utah Code Ann. SS 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1990), 17-22-2
(Supp. 1990), 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988).

-8-
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the taint of the illegality of the detention."

Id- at 13-

It

noted that under State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by
exploitation of the primary police illegality*"

Ibid.

Applying

the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of
the illegal roadblock."

Id. at 14.

In arriving at this

conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1)
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to
the search.

Ibid.

In Arrovo. this Court did not make clear how the
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by
that illegality.

796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown

v. Illinois factors which should be considered, jld. at 690-91
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather
•9-
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the police misconduct itself.

Arrovo cites numerous cases on the

issue of exploitation, id. at 690-91, but does not express a
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to
adopt.
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See,
e.g., United States v. Miller. 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987)
(M[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not
sufficiently attenuated. . . . [TJhere were insufficient
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a
voluntary decision about the consent search."); United States v.
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem. 464 So.2d 293, 298
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free
will.").
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the
police misconduct.

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356# 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom,
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406; 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant
case.
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted
in Arroyo.

796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the

defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness
of the consent.

Rover, 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring)

("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's]
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as
consensual.").
Because the court of appeals has construed the
exploitation prong of Arrovo to focus primarily on the "temporal
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent -- a view
seemingly adopted in Rover, it has decided an important question
of law which was not decided in Arroyo, but which should be
decided by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

Accordingly, the

Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals'
iju-

decision.
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of the second consent, however, the chaos of
the initial entry was over six hours distant,
defendant had been informed of his Miranda
rights a second time and Agent Conner
reviewed anew each item on the consent form.
The court therefore concludes from a totality
of the circumstances that the State has met
its burden of proof that the second consent
to search the storage unit was knowingly and
voluntarily granted. The court makes this
conclusion after fully considering that
defendant was shackled for six hours at the
time he signed the second consent form for
the storage unit.17
Id. at 12-13 (R. 78-79).

Again, defendant does not show that

the court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous,
content simply to suggest that this Court make a different
finding on the voluntariness question. Moreover, the record
provides substantial support for the court's finding.
In sum, in the absence of a showing that the trial
court was clearly erroneous, there is no basis for disturbing its
findings that both of defendant's consents were voluntary.
Therefore, the court's determination on the first prong of the
Arrovo test should be upheld.
Exploitation
The exploitation prong of the Arrovo test is not so
easily understood or applied.

Addressing this prong, the trial

court said:

17

In arguing both the voluntariness and exploitation prongs
of Arrovo. defendant places undue emphasis on his being
handcuffed much of the time and being continuously detained. See
Br. of Appellant at 11-14. It is well settled that handcuffs and
custody, while factors to be considered, do not themselves render
consent involuntary. State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah
App. 1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).
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The same evidence which persuaded this court
that each consent was knowingly and
voluntarily granted equally but independently
persuades this court that the officers did
not exploit the initial unlawful entry. The
circumstances and passage of time from the
entry to the first consent purged each of the
consents from the taint of the unauthorized
-no-knock" entry. The officers did nothing
to harken back to the entry and did not make
any further unnecessary show of force not
otherwise implicit by their presence.
Focusing solely on the second consent to
search the storage unit, the passage of time
proved to be the best antiseptic, cleansing
the second consent of any taint from the
unlawful "no-knock" entry.
Order at 13 (R. 79). Before reviewing this finding of no
exploitation, some discussion of the second prong of the Arrovo
test, and the need for this Court to clarify the operation of
that prong, is necessary.
Without explaining precisely how the exploitation
analysis is to proceed, Arrovo suggested only that the specific
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by
that illegality.

796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown

v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), factors which should be
considered, .id. at 690-91 n.4, but did not make clear whether the
primary focus of the exploitation analysis is the possible effect
of the initial police misconduct on the voluntariness of the
consent or rather the police misconduct itself.

Arrovo cites

numerous cases on the issue of exploitation, id. at 690-91, but
does not express a preference for one of the two approaches those
cases appear to adopt.

Under one approach, voluntariness of the
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consent is the primary consideration, and if there is voluntary
consent (i.e., the consent has not been rendered involuntary by
the prior police illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the
consent is generally admissible.

Under the other approach, the

police misconduct itself is the primary consideration.

A consent

to search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the
police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is -tainted," and
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible.
For example, some of the cases cited in Arrovo discuss
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the
consent.

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550

(11th Cir. 1987) (f'[W]e hold that the consent was the product of
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United
States v, Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v.
Raheem. 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be
a product of her free will.").
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On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent has been undermined by the
police misconduct*

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and whether it Htaints" the consent such that
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom,
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
The latter approach was followed by two panels of the
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App.
1991), cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991),
and State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 827
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which involved consent searches after
illegal roadblock stops18.

In Sims, the panel began its

analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not challenge
the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but that he
claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his detention
and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the illegality of the
detention."

808 P.2d at 150.

It applied the Brown v. Illinois

18

At the time the roadblocks were set up in Sims and Park,
there was no decision from either Utah's appellate courts or the
United States Supreme Court that had directly ruled on the
legality of such roadblocks. See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at
142-50. Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly characterized
as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though the court of
appeals concluded that they violated those provisions.
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factors which Arrovo identified as pertinent to the evaluation of
the "non-exploitation or attenuation element":

"the temporal

proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the
consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances,
and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct."
jbid.

Concluding that "the record demonstrates [the defendant's]

consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of
the illegal roadblock," A£. at 152, the panel relied most heavily
on two factors:

(1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of

the illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between
the two;" and (2) "the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and [the
defendant's] grant of consent to the search," id. at 151. An
identical approach was followed by the Park panel in reversing
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
810 P.2d at 458-59.
This mechanical application of the exploitation prong,
which automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wono Sun v. United
States. 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

See United States v.

Wellins. 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant
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intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation").

As

stated in Arrovo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police.'"

796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong

Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted).

But, given Arrovo's

ambiguous discussion of the exploitation prong, it was not
unreasonable for the court of appeals to interpret Arrovo as
setting forth the mechanical rule applied in Sims and Park.

What

those cases illustrate is the need for clarification by this
Court of how the exploitation prong should be applied by the
lower courts.
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they
fail to acknowledge that in Arrovo the Court remanded to the
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a
search of the vehicle).

796 P.2d at 692. Had this Court

considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as
Sims and Park concluded, it presumably would not have remanded
for a determination of that question by the trial court.

In

ordering a remand, Arrovo implicitly rejected the mechanical
approach to the exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park.
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry,
36
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which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be
most consistent with Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983),
identified in Arrovo as an example of the application of the
exploitation prong in a consent search case.

796 P.2d at 690.

In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a
search of his luggagef in which narcotics were found.19

Royer

moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage.

The

trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the
search was "freely and voluntarily" given.

460 U.S. at 495. The

intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention
tainted Royer's consent to search.

19

Ibid.

That decision was

The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows:
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a
small room and retrieved his luggage from the
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally
responding to this request, Royer produced a
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which
one detective then opened without seeking
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was
found in that suitcase. According to
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did
not know the combination to the lock on the
second suitcase. When asked if he objected
to the detective opening the second suitcase,
Royer said "[n]o, oo ahead,H and did not
object when the detective explained that the
suitcase might have to be broken open. The
suitcase was pried open by the officers and
more marihuana was found. . . •

460 U.S. at 494-95.

37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion.

460 U.S.

at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 690, the
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it
nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the
consent.

This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in

which he wrote:

"I agree with the plurality that . . . [the

defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot
be viewed as consensual."

460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J.,

concurring).
In Arrovo, this Court rejected an exploitation analysis
that focuses solely

on voluntariness, declining to adopt the

reasoning of United States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied/ 479 U.S. 914 (1986).

There, the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals held:
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to
illegal police actions, the "exploitation"
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by
determining whether or not defendant's grant
of consent was voluntary under the
circumstances. . . • When defendant's grant
of consent is voluntary, then there is no
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary
consent and "exploitation" are mutually
exclusive.
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original).

However, the Court's

rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its
reliance on Rover.

In this light, Arrovo is most reasonably read
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as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search.

Under

such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily
and logically applied.
In Brown, the Supreme Court had before it the narrow
question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error in
assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun
always purge the taint of an illegal arrest."

422 U.S. at 605.

Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without a
warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder.
Id. at 591, 594-95.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that,

although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion.' (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'"
Jd. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 317, 307
N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974)).

At bottom, the state court held that

"the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain
so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the
continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so
long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not
coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Ibid.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
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implication of its holding in Wonor Sun to the facts of Brown's
case.

Ibid.
The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun,

where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded.M
Id. at 597. The statements were obtained from two defendants,
Wong Sun and Toy.

Toy's statement was obtained immediately after

he was pursued and illegally arrested by six agents.

It

apparently was a spontaneous response to a question asked him in
the frenzy of that event, and the agents apparently made no
attempt to advise him of his right to remain silent.

On the

other hand, Wong Sun's statement, also obtained after an illegal
arrest, was not given until after he was arraigned and released
on his own recognizance.

He voluntarily returned to the station

a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his statement
came after he had been advised of his right to remain silent and
to have counsel present.
in part).

Id,, at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring

Under these facts, the Wona Sun Court ruled that Toy's

statement should not have been admitted as evidence against him,
holding that "the statement did not result from 'an intervening
independent act of a free will,' and that it was not
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion.'-

IcL at 598 (quoting Wona Sun. 371 U.S.

at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so

40
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"

Ibid, (quoting Wono Sun,

371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted).
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he
exclusionary rule . • • was applied in Wona Sun primarily
protect Fourth Amendment rights.

to

Protection of the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's
paramount concern there." 2d. at 599 (emphasis in original).

In

short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police ~

thus the

different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's
statement.

As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring

opinion, "the Wono Sun inquiry always should be conducted with
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
sharply in focus." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part)
(citation omitted).
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court
rejected the per se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois
courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per se or "but
for" rule of exclusion.

Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he

question whether a confession is the product of a free will under
Wona Sun roust be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no
single fact is dispositive."

Id. at 603.

It made clear that the

presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment
violation is admissible.

While that factor is important in
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determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be
considered, including:

"[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest

and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances,
andf particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct."

jCd. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted).

It is with this understanding of Wona Sun and Brown
that Arrovo must be read.

As previously discussed, Arrovo

specifically relied on Rover as an example of the application of
the exploitation analysis to a case where evidence was seized
pursuant to a consent to search which followed an initial fourth
amendment violation.

The Rover plurality's primary concern

appears to have been the voluntariness of the consent to search.
Thus, Arrovo's reference to the Brown factors, coupled with its
reliance on Rover and its rejection of Carson, is most reasonably
interpreted as an adoption of an exploitation analysis which (1)
focuses primarily, but not solely, on the voluntariness of the
consent, (2) applies the Brown factors to determine whether the
voluntariness of the consent was in fact affected by the prior
police illegality, and (3) considers whether the police
misconduct was sufficiently flagrant or purposeful that the
evidence should be excluded even though the consent to search was
entirely voluntary.

The inquiry would proceed as follows:

(1)

Was the the consent in fact rendered involuntary by the temporal
proximity between the fourth amendment violation and the consent,
the absence of any intervening circumstances, or flagrant police
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misconduct?20 (2) Even if it is determined that the consent was
voluntary after consideration of the possible effect of all three
Brown factors, was the police misconduct purposeful or flagrant
such that the evidence should be excluded in order to deter that
level of police misconduct?

Kith respect to this second

question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment, then the first two Brown factors (temporal
proximity and intervening circumstances) are considered to
determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to remove the
"taint" from the flagrant violation which would naturally flow
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell
illustrated this process in the confession context:
I would require the clearest indication of
attenuation in cases in which official
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth
Amendment r i g h t s . . . . In such cases the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is
most likely to be effective, and the
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial
integrity most clearly demands that the
fruits of the official misconduct be denied.
I thus would require some demonstrably
effective break in the chain of events
leading from the illegal arrest to the
statement, such as actual consultation with
counsel or the accused's presentation before
a magistrate for a determination of probable
cause, before the taint can be deemed
removed.

20

Consideration of voluntariness under the exploitation
prong of the Arrovo test may overlap to some degree with the
voluntariness inquiry which has already occurred under the first
prong of that test. However, under the exploitation prong,
particular attention is paid to the police illegality and its
possible effect on voluntariness.
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422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted).

A similar analysis would

be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficiently
attenuated in terms of time and circumstance to be free of the
taint of the flagrant police misconduct.21
This approach recognizes both that Min some
circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on legitimate demands of
law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent
purposes," and that in cases of flagrant police misconduct "the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be
effective.*1

Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 611 (Powell, J.,

concurring in part).
The Court should clarify Arrovo in the foregoing
manner.

The exploitation prong will then be understandable and

more easily applied.
Under the proposed clarification, the trial court's
exploitation/attenuation finding should be upheld.

In fact, the

court essentially applied Arrovo in the manner suggested.
Apparently proceeding with the assumption that the violation of
section 77-23-10 was not flagrant (a correct assumption, in that
there was no indication the officers purposefully violated the
21

For example, had the officers' conduct in Sims actually
been flagrant, which it was not, the court of appeals would have
been correct in excluding the evidence on the basis that there
was no significant lapse of time or intervening circumstances
between the consent to search and the illegality. But in the
absence of flagrant conduct, the approach followed in Sims was
incorrect for the reasons previously discussed.
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statute), the court focused primarily on the voluntariness of
defendant's consent in light of the prior illegality.

This is

obvious from the court's statement that "[t]he same evidence
which persuaded th[e] court that each consent was knowingly and
voluntarily granted equally but independently persuades th[e]
court that the officers did not exploit the initial unlawful
entry.-

Order at 13 (R. 79). The court applied the first two

Brown factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances,
by specifically considering the changed circumstances and the
passage of time between the unlawful entry and the two consents.
Eighty-five minutes passed between the officers' initial entry
and defendant's signing of the first consent form for the search
of his storage unit, and the situation within his apartment had
calmed significantly from the "chaosM associated with the entry.
Defendant's signing of the second consent form at the storage
unit, over five hours after the initial entry and under
circumstances where he was not handcuffed and was allowed to move
around (R. 128-29), was even more attenuated from the entry.

See

Order at 13.
In sum, the trial court found that the passage of time
and the changed circumstances significantly reduced the
possibility that the officers' unlawful entry undermined
defendant's free will in giving his consent.

This approach is

entirely consistent with several cases cited with apparent
approval in Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 691, and which were noted above:
United States v. Miller. 821 F.2d at 550 (H[W]e hold that the
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consent was the product of the illegal detention, and that the
taint of the unreasonable stop was not sufficiently attenuated. .
• . [T]here were insufficient intervening circumstances that
might have reduced the coercive nature of the stop and permitted
the appellant to make a voluntary decision about the consent
search.-); United States v. Taheri. 648 F.2d at 601 (Hno
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v,
Raheem, 464 So.2d at 298 ("Under the circumstances presented
here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be
a product of her free will.").

In that the court's finding of

attenuation is supported by the record and defendant has not
shown clear error, that finding should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress.
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